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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

JESS

JI~IENEZ,

Plai'Y/)tiff and Respondent,

Case No.
7264

vs.
RAY O'BRIEN and BOYD BYRON
BROADWA~ER,
De fendants and Appellants.
1

STATEMENT OF F AC.TS
This appeal involves the validity of certain releases
signed and delivered by the plaintiff, Jess Jimenez, August 14, 1945, the time when he left the hospital and the
following September 5th, for personal injuries sustained
in an automobile accident of July 9, 1945. Plaintiff admitted the execution of the releases, but claimed that
they were invalid by reason of total mental incompetency
at the time of ,fueir ·execution (See plaintiff's Reply, Tr.
60-2).
Jimenez, age forty-one when the accident occurred
(Tr. 181), had been residing at 221 West 4th South for
about three years. Prior ther·eto, he came from Pueblo

'
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Colorado where his mother and brother were still living. He had three children by Rita Gounis, his former
wife, who was driving the car in which he was riding at
the tim·e of the accident. When injured, he had just terminated his employment repairing shoes at the Boston Shoe
Repair Shop on Third South (Tr. 183-192). He also testified to having had experience as a boiler maker (Tr.182).

~i

Plaintiff was rendered unconscious on account of
the accident and taken to the County Hospital for a few
hours and then to the St. Mark's Hospital where heremained from July 9th to August 14th, 1945. X-rays revealed there were no fractures (Tr. 260). The injury was
diagnosed by Dr. Stewart Alma Wright, the attending
physician, as a severe brain contusion (Tr. 246-7).
His stay in the hospital was marked by a period of
unconsciousness and semi-consciousness. Dr. Wright
testified there was gradual improvement, plaintiff suffering a set-back the eighth or tenth day, but from thereon,
he responded to measures that were used (Tr. 247). He
was watched by Dr. Wright very carefully (Tr. 249) and
regular progress notes were made by him to see if he
was recovering (Tr. 262). By July 29th, he was "clear
mentally." (Tr. 265). Plaintiff showed steady improvement after August 1, 1945 (Tr. 274). By August 11th he
was "increasing his activity daily" and "had no complaints whatever" (Tr. 265). For the last few days prior
to the time he, plaintiff, left the hospital, August 14th,
he was ambulatory and walked around and was able to
take care of his needs (Tr. 269). When he left the hosSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pi tal, Dr. 'y right made a complete exmuination and recheck to make sure he was normal (Tr. 266). He (Dr.
Wright) · •had every reason to expect plaintiff would
continue to improve from that time on, if he took care
of himself.'' (Tr. 27±). 'Vith reference to August 14th,
he said: ··I don't thinK he was irrational, in my opinion,
on that date." ( Tr. 269).
The nurses' daily record (Ex. 8) kept at the hospital
for the purpose of showing· the medications and treatments given, all observations made, and the way the
patient reacts and responds and any complaints that he
has or other symptoms (Tr. 416) confirmed plaintiff's
steady recovery, as did Dr. Wright's progress reports
(Ex. 7).
The attending nurses, Mary L. Pierce and Margaret
Anderson, both testified that on August 14th and for
several days prior thereto, Jimenez conversed normally
and there was nothing irrational or incoherent about his
speech or his actions ( Tr. 420, 424-5). No medications of
any type were adniinistered August 14 (Tr. 258). He had
regular visitors at the hospital, including Rita Gounis,
his daughter, a brother from Colorado and other friends.
Ben Duncan, the insurance adjuster for Farmers
Inter-Insurance Exchange, 1114 Continental Bank Building, insurer of the O'Brien car, first called at the St.
Mark's Hospital to interview Jimenez July 13th, four
days after the accident. Plaintiff was then under sedatives, so Mr. Duncan excused himself (Tr. 382), calling
again about a week later when "he (Jimenez) was much
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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better.'' Jimenez conversed and related his family background, but did not recall the facts of the accident. Duncan said that no attempt to obtain a written statement
at that time was made ( Tr. 383). He thereafter made
repeated visits, six or seven in all, during which time
Jimenez would recognize him and carry on regular conversations (Tr. 383). Other than being a little weak,
there was nothing unusual about his appearance. One
time, about August 1st, Duncan found him walking
around outside the ward ( Tr. 384).
On August 13th, in order to get a statement from
plaintiff, Mr. Duncan employed Alice Pannier as a secretary to take the matter down in question and answer
form. (Tr. 385). This statement, Exhibit 10, showed
plaintiff to be entirely rational at that time, giving a
clear, concise answer to all questions, including his entire background. At that time Jimenez explained his
plans to leave with his brother for Colorado, the next
day (Tr. 38).
Duncan returned to the hospital during visiting
hours that evening and discussed settlement (Tr. 387).
The amount of the doctor and hospital expense had not
been ascertained, but a tentative settlement was agreed
upon in the amount of $1,000 general damages, plus the
hospital and doctor bills (Tr. 388). Duncan then contacted
Dr. Wright and ascertained the amount of his doctor
bill ($500) and the hospital bill ($182.05) (Tr. 389). On
August 14th, while Mr. Duncan was in the insurance office at the Continental Bank Building, someone phoned
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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him from the hospital (apparently on behalf of Jimenez)
(Tr. 389) requesting that he come over. He thereupon
took with him insurance company drafts and releases in
accordance with the terms of their propos-ed settlement
(Tr. 390). He found plaintiff fully dressed sitting on
the bed with a blonde lady friend and his suit case at
the foot of the bed (prepared to leave the hospital) (Tr.
390). Duncan ·explained the releases and drafts in detail.
Then in accordance with the practice of the insurance
company, he took what he ealled a supporting statement
in long hand. This statement (Exhibit 9) in the hand-

writing of Mr. Duncan recited the facts of the accident;
that he suffered a brain contusion and that he was hospitalized until his release that day. It further stated:
"I understand that the sum of One Thousand
Six Hundred and Eighty-Two Dollars and Five
Cents is all the money I will receive from any
source as a result of the accident of July 6, 1945.
I understand that my injury may be of a permanent nature, and by my own choice I choose to
settle in full of claims of the accident of July 6th,
1945.''
Then at the bottom, Jimenez in his own handwriting
wrote:
''This statement is true.
Jess Gimenez.''
A usual form release (Exhibit 6) in the amount of
$1682.05 was voluntarily signed and delivered by JimSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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enez, who in his own handwriting likewise wrote at the
bottom:
''I have read this releases and understand it
to be a release in full.
Jess Gimenez" (Tr. 391).
Three insurance company drafts were signed and
delivered to Jimenez, one payable to Jess Gimenez and
St. Mark's Hospital in the amount of $182.05, a second
draft to Jess Gimenez and Dr. Alma Wright for $500,
and a third draft payable to Jess Gimenez for $1,000.
These drafts were each duly endorsed by plaintiff, Dr.
Wright and the Hospital and cashed in the due course of
business through Walker Bank & Trust Company and
the First National Bank. The $1,000 draft payable to
Jimenez alone was presented to and paid by the Walker
Bank & Trust Company August 22, 1945. Each draft (see
Exhibits 1, 3 and 4) above the endorsement reads:
"Endorsement of this draft constitutes a release of ail claims, known or unknown, the undersigned has or may have against Farmers Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange and the insured
and any other person on account of any and all
claims arising out of the accident referred to on
the face hereof.''
After getting out of the hospital, plaintiff changed
his mind about going to Colorado and said he decided to
stay in Salt Lake (Tr. 200).
Plaintiff was next seen by Mr. Duncan the following
September 5th when he, plaintiff and Rita Gounis called
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at the insurance office in the Continental Bank Building,
on which occasion plaintiff reminded Duncan that he
had promised to pay all his hospital bills and that there
was one which he, Jimenez, had neglected to mention, and
that was $26.35 incurred at the General Hospital for
emergency treatment immediately following the accident (Tr. 393). Upon presentation of this bill, which had
been overlooked, :Mr. Duncan issued a draft for the
stated amount payable to plaintiff (See Exhibit 2) which
contained a similar recital to the other drafts. This was
duly endorsed by Jimenez, delivered to the Salt Lake
County Hospital, which likewise endorsed, and it was
cleared through the banks in the regular course of business.
Immediately after Jimenez left, it occurred to Mr.
Duncan, that for payment of the $26.35 he should get a
further release, so he caught up with Jimenez in the Bank
Building lobby and asked him to go back up to the office
and sign another release reciting the $26.35 consideration
(Tr. 394). Jimenez acknowledged the voluntary ~execution
of this release (Exhibit 5), as he did the first one ( Tr.
341, 343). His attitude was entirely friendly (Tr. 394).
In his own handwriting, he wrote at the bottom of the
latter release :
"I have read these release and understand it
to be a release in full.
Jess Jimenez" (Tr. 395).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There was nothing unusual about his manner of conversation, appearance or speech on that occasion (Tr.
395).
Later on account of tiredness and inability to sleep,
plaintiff says he saw Dr. Wright to see if the doctor could
calm him down ( Tr. 184). The visits wer·e made to Dr.
Wright's office September 15th and November 1st, 1945.
The doctor recommended rest from work and a mild seda·tive (Tr. 258). On those occasions the doctor conversed
with plaintiff, who understood him, and r•esponded clearly. There was nothing irrational about his appearance
(Tr. 259).
The first steps to commence this suit were taken October 16, 1945 (Tr. 208) when the first summons (Exhibit 11) was served. The complaint on file her·ein was
signed by plaintiff December 15, 1945 ('Tr. 208), and filed
December 31, 1945 (Tr. 6).
Plaintiff complained of getting worse (Tr. 209) and
about November, after the first summons was served,
he went to Colorado, staying at his mother's place in
Pueblo ( Tr. 185). He got worse when he rode the train
''that is what really got me.'' He stayed in bed for a
time (Tr. 209). He felt worse for about a y•ear (Tr. 185,
206).
In Pueblo, he saw Dr. J. L. Rosenbloom, Assistant
Superintendent of the Colorado State Hospital, as a
private patient at the Corwin Hospital. He made visits
to see Dr. Rosenbloom November 8th, November 15th,
November 29th and December 15, 1945, the following FebSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ruary 3th, :J[arch :28th and August 5, 1946, and July 7,
1947 (Tr. 356).
The only other doctor he saw was Dr. Garland H.
Pace, neurologist and psychiatrist on one occasion in
October, 1947, (Tr. 311), more than two years after the
time of the releases.
Plaintiff returned to Salt Lake in August or Sep·tember, 1946, (Tr. 185). He obtained employment operating an ·elevator in the Continental Bank for about a week.
He then worked from September into December at the
Tooele Ordnance Depot (Tr. 186, 200); then for four or
five months he worked in :Magna for Babcock and Wilcox
taking care of a tool room ( Tr. 187-8, 200). He stayed in
Colorado during the summer of 1947 ( Tr. 188). He returned to Salt Lake the following September or October
and obtained employment at the Anderson Dam in Idaho
for a couple of months (Tr. 188). He then worked in
periods (Tr. 188). At the time of the trial he was working
at Devil's Slide but was off to attend the trial. There he
was engaged in putting up a water tank in-the air, working on a scaffolding one hundred fift·een to one hundred
twenty feet high ( Tr. 189, 204, 205). His only complaints
then were inability to stay with his customary work continu~msly as he used to do (Tr. 189), and that he still did
not sleep well (Tr. 190).
Plaintiff's attorneys acknowledged in open court
(Tr. 149) that Jimenez was not mentally incompetent at
the time of commencement of suit (the first summons was
served October 16, 1945; the complaint actually filed DeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cember 31, 1948), and further stipulated that the re1eases,
drafts, etc., were all signed by plaintiff (Tr. 336).
Jimenez retained all of the benefits and money received by him through the settlement and at no time
made any offer or tender to return the consideration received by him.
The court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant Ray O'Brien, the owner of the other automobile involved in the accident, there being no proof of agency or
independent negligence on his part.
As to the defendant, Boyd Byron Broadwater, the
driver of said automobile, the court submitted the case
to the jury on the sole issue of mental competency to
executje the releases. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff against the defendant in the amount
of $5,000, less $1708.40, the amount received by Jimenez,
or a net verdict of $3,291.60 (Tr. 447). Defendant's motion for new trial was denied (Tr. 447-8). The defendant, Boyd Byron Broadwater, has appealed from judgment.

QUES.TIONS ON APPEAL
The errors raised on this appeal relate entirely to
'two matters, namely:
1. The insufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
finding of mental incompetency at the time of the execution of the releases, August 14th and September 5,-1945;
and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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2. The question of ratification by reason of plaintiff's accepting the benefits of said settlement and failing to tender or offer to return the benefits of said settlement.
ASSIGN~IENT

OF ERRORS

The court erred in the following particulars:
1. In denying the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict (Tr. -±36-8), and in refusing defendant's requested
instruction No. 2 ( Tr. 105), for a directed verdict in
favor of the defendant Boyd Byron Broadwater, duly
excepted to ( Tr. 445) .
2. In submitting the issue of mental competency to
the jury by giving its instruction No. 4 (Tr. 91), No. 5
(Tr. 92), duly excepted to (Tr. 444) and instruction No.
14 (Tr. 99), No. 14a (Tr. 100), and No. 15 ('Tr. 101), each
duly excepted to (Tr. 445).
3. In overruling defendant's motion for a new tria:l
(Tr. 447-8).

AUTHORITIES
Right of individuals to make a compromise settlement of personal injury claims by contractual release is
discussed in Anderson v. O.S.L., 47 Utah 614, 155 Pac.
446. The court pointed out that it is not necessary ~that
the parties can at the time foresee or contemplate every
possible consequence that may subsequently arise from
an injury. Said the court:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Fortunately such is not the law. If it were,
settlements, instead of becoming the means of
avoiding strife and unnecessary litigation, would
become a most prolific source of both. The gen·eral rule respecting the legal effect of such releases is well stated by the Supreme Court of
Texas in the case of Houston, etc., Ry. Co. v. McCarty, 94 Tex. 298, 60 S. W. 429, 53 L.R.A. 507,
86 Am. St. Rep. 854. * * *
'' 'Where a party, who has a claim against another for personal injuries, agrees upon a settlement of his claim, and accepts a sum of money or
other thing of value in settlement of such claim, he
is, in the absence of fraud or concealment, concluded in the settlement, is a proposition sustained, as we think, by one unbroken line of
authority,' citing numerous cases."
AUTHORITIES AS TO MEN·TAL CAPACITY
The test of mental capacity is stated in Ratch v.
Hatch, 148 Pac. 433,46 Utah 218, as follows:
" 'In ordinary contracts the test is, Were
the mental faculties so deficient or impaired that
there was not sufficient power to comprehend the
subject of the contract, its nature and its prob:
able consequences, and to act with discretion in
relation thereto, or with relation to the ordinary
affairs of life~' ''
In that case the action was to set aside two deeds on the
grounds of mental incompetency and undue influence.
The deeds were executed January 31, 1908 and June 1,
1908. The grantor di~ed December 2, 1911, at the age of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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eighty-two. This court held that the evidence was insufficient to authorize a finding that the deceased ''at
the time he made the deeds in question was not possessed
of sufficient mental capacity to make valid conveyance of
his property.'' The court further added :
"Nor is the evidence sufficient to authorize a
finding that the deceased, at the time he made the
deeds in question, was not possessed of sufficient
mental capacity to make valid conveyances of his
property.''
"Nor does Comp. Laws 1907, Section 4001
(now Sec. 102-13-20 of the probate code defining
an incompetent) referred to by counsel for appellant, change the test. To hold that under all the
facts and circumstances disclosed by the record
before us the deceased did not possess the necessary mental capacity to enter into and execute ordinary contracts affecting property and property
rights would result in laying down a rule whereby
most all of the transactions of aged men and
women who had some mental defects could be
successfully assailed in courts of ·equity. No general or hard and fast rule which shall govern or
control in all cases can be promulgated, but every
case must, to a very large extent, be determined
upon the facts and circumstanc-es present in that
case.''
The court made the following observations of the
evidence:
''There is much evidence to the effect that
during the last five or six years preceding his
death the deceas·ed suffered 'lapses of memory to
the extent that in the same conversation he would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ask the same question two or three times. A doctor, a grandson of the deceas-ed, testified that his
failing memory and his general mental condition
was the result of a disease known as 'arterial
sclerosis,' which, he said, caused a 'hardening of
the arteries,' which resulted in what the doctor
called attacks of epilepsy, or what are commonly
called epileptic fits. It was shown that the deceased had several .of such attacks, the first one
along in 1906 and several more thereafter during
the later years of his life. Indeed, it is contended
that he suffered an attack the day or evening preceding the 1st day of June, 1908, the day the last
deed in question here was executed, but from some
other evidence the court was justified in ·entertaining some doubt with regard to that question. It
was also made to appear that usually an attack
would produce unconsciousness which would at
times last for several hours, and that the attacks
would affect the deceased's mind more or less for
some time thereafter. A large number of witnesses
testified with respect to the mental condition of
the deceased, but we think the deductions from
the facts detailed in the evidence are perhaps best
reflected from the testimony of Abram C. Hatch,
the plaintiff. * * * We copy his statements in that
regard from the bill of exceptions as follows:
'' 'There were times between 1906 and 1909
when his mind was much better than it was at
other times, and I would say that at times during
that period from 1906 up to 1909-up to December, 1908, I will put it-he might have been competent to transact ordinary business with which
he was acquainted, and other times for quite
lengthy periods of times when he was, in my
opinion, absolutely incompetent; then from on or
about December, 1908, until his death there were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
Yery great differences in his condition of mind.
He had these attacks. I don't know what they
were. During the attacks he was unconscious, and
after it was reported that he had another attack,
it was considerable time before he was what I
would call rational, so that he could do business
at all. ~-\.nd from 1904-I would say the latter part
of 1903-I noticed from the latter part of 1903
that he was at times unfit and incompetent to
transact business, but I will say that in my judgment from 1905 he was in a condition so that any
one in whom he had confidence might have overreached him in a business transaction very well,
very easily'."
:Jir. "\Villis, a lawyer who prepared and acknowledged
one of the deeds among other things testified:
''He had, as lots of people do, a failing of
memory somewhat as people do when they grow
older. I suppose he understood what he was doing
when he executed those deeds, but I had reason to
think otherwise from what he said afterward.
Right at the time he executed these deeds I think
he knew what he was doing, and I accordingly
took his acknowledgment and I certified in that
acknowledgment that he duly acknowledged to the
execution of that deed.''
In O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 Pac. (2d)
770, the court reaffirmed the same test as to competency
and held that the grantor, a woman of eighty-six years
of age, was as a matter of law legally competent to execut,e the deed, notwithstanding testimony of a Mr. Giles
"that her mental condition was very bad in March,
1930" (the deed having been executed about September
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
30, 1929). Dr. Root testified that "she was of unsound
mind in March, 1930, and that this condition had existed
for s~even or ·eight years.'' 'The court remarked that from
his testimony as a whole that her condition was one of
forgetfulness and not of incompetency, and that it was
evident from ihe whole of his testimony that her unsoundness of mind consisted of an inability to recollect
and a straying of the mind from the subject of the conversation, he having admitted that she "understands
what you say and has all the time, and evidently understands all she says.''
In 'Bawson v. Hardy, 86 Utah 50, 39 Pac. (2d) 755,
the ~uit was to set aside a deed executed by the plaintiff,
an inmate of the State Mental Hospital at Phoenix,
Arizona. The deed was dated June 1, 1923. The record
disclos,ed that plaintiff had been three times committed
to mental hospitals, once in 1912, once in 1913 and recommitted the same year, and once again in 1928. The last
committment said:
"The diagnosis in this case is that of Dementia Praecox of paranoid type, which I consider a chronic and incurable mental disease.''
The court in holding there was no evidence to justify a
finding of incompetency as to the execution of the deed
commented upon the fact that the testimony of witnesses
concerning some of the things done and the tendencies
manifested by the grantor were things that might be
termed oddities or peculiarities, but that none of it was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sufficient to justify a finding of mental incompetence
as to the execution of the deed.

Burgess v. Colby, 93 Utah 103, 71 Pac. (2d) 185 was
a suit to set aside a deed dated September 16, 1933.
Grantor was 78 years of age in ill health, having died
September 25, 1933, nine days after ·eX!ecuting the deed.
It was alleged that grantor was ''wholly incompetent to
transact business.'' The Supreme Court reviewed the
entire case as an equity matter and reversed the finding of the lower court wherein the lower court found the
grantor was incompetent and held that under the evidence grantor was competent as a matter of law. The
facts show that grantor was seriously ill for three or
four weeks before his death and several witnesses described him as being incompetent, delirious, flighty, etc.
The court said :
"That while he was a sick man and getting
weaker day by day and having difficulty of speech
on account of having lost his teeth and some apparent soreness, yet he was able to talk about the
affairs of the day, of his travels, of the farm and
its care, and to recognize his friends when they
called. The witnesses for plaintiffs who say that
he rambled in his talk or was delirious seemed to
use this word in a rather inaccurate way. The
rambling apparently was that the old man would
change from one subject to another and even
these witnesses give very little report of any
actual delirium.
The judgment and decree of the trial court is
reversed and set aside. * * * ''
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He,ath v. Arwovitz, 102 Utah 1, 126 Pac. (2d) 1058,
was a proceeding to appoint a guardian of an alleged incompetent. In holding the evidence was insufficient to
prove incompetency under 8ection 102-13-20, the Court
said:
''The section implies physical or mental defects which interfere with the rational functioning
of the mind. If the mind functions rationally but
the individual acts in a way commonly designated
as eccentric-that is, his acts deviate from the
usual principally because he is less susceptible to
public opinion than are many of us-he is not incompetent.
''Such confusion as appears in his answers
apparently arises either from defective hearing
or ignorance of the facts or law but those answers
do not show a mind laboring under difficulty of
functioning.''
''The evidence must show a lack of power to
function-not an unwillingness to or lack of interest in functioning, be the latter two ever so
reprehensible as personal characteristics.''
See also Chadd v. Moser, 25 Utah 369, 71 P. 870.
In Pope v. Bailey-Marsh Go., (N. Dak.), 151 N. W.
18, it was held error to deny defendant's motion
for a directed verdict where releases were questioned
upon grounds of mental incompetency and fraud, although plaintiff disclaimed any knowledge of executing
the release and claimed to be in great pain and suffering
at that time, while employees of the hospital and the
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party taking the release testified to his apparent rationality. The court said:

•· * * * we are forced to the conclusion that
plaintiff, \Yho concededly had the burden of proof
of showing facts relieving him of the legal effect
of such formal release by clear and convincing
proof, has failed in meeting such burden.
•' * * * written instruments cannot be impeached for fraud or any other cause except upon
proof that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing,
and of such a character as to leave in the mind of
the chancellor no hesitation of substantial doubt.''

In San Antonio & A. P. Rai.lway Oo. v. Fo.Zka (Tex.),
124 S. W. 226, the court held the evidence insufficient
to find lack of mental capacity to e~ecute a release, notwithstanding !the releasor's wife's testimony that she
noticed a difference in his mental condition after the
injury, such as his loss of pride, loss of self respect, disregard for his wife and child, his sloppy dress, double
vision and various peculiarities such as: ''He would call
me and when I would get into the room and ask him
what he wanted, he would say he uev;er called me."
In Carlson v. Elwell (Minn.), 151 N. W. 188, plaintiff signed a release in the hospital on July 25th but
claimed he had no recollecdon of the matter, having
no m~emory from July 18th, the time of an operation, till
September. Others testified to plaintiff's ability to talk
fair English, answer questions intelligently, though he
seemed to lack education and appeared t.o be dull. Dr.
Collins, superintendent of the hospital, testified that
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plaintiff was irrational at times during the Winter and
Spring, but that at other times he was rational and intelligent. The person taking the release, plaintiff's attorney on the case, testified concerning the execution of
the release under circumstances when plaintiff evidently
knew what he was doing. The court revers·ed a judgment
based on a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and ordered
judgment entered for the defendant.
INADEQUACY OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE
In the instant case, plaintiff attempted to prove
mental incompetency through opinion evidence of Drs.
Rosenbloom and Pace. Neither of •these witnesses saw
plaintiff until after steps were taken to commence suit
and until after the lapse of several months' time from the
execution of the releases, when circumstances and conditions had changed. When plaintiff first saw Dr. Rosenbloom November 8, 1945, plaintiff had just suffered a setback, had gotten sick on the train, became worse in bed
several days. He then complained ·of dizziness, headaches,
instability, disturbed sleep, etc., whereas at the time of
the releases, he, plaintiff, had "no complaints."
He was never seen by Dr. Pace except for the one
examination of October, 1947, over two years after the
second release of September 5, 1945. No treatment was
given or recommended.
Of the several friends and relatives who visited
plaintiff at the hospital, the only one called by plaintiff
as a witness was l\1:rs. L. D. Loy, a close friend who reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lated an incident in the hospital when plaintiff told about
having a gun under the bed and having shot some pigeons
which she was to take home, and other oddities and inconsistencies in his actions before he left for Colorado
(Tr. 22-1-2-11). Even she testified that befor·e he left the
hospital, he was walking around and !that sometimes he
appeared very rational, talked rationally and was rational as far as she could see at those times (Tr. 241).

PLAIN"TIFF'S TESTIMONY
Plaintiff at the time of the taking of his deposition,
September 12, 1947, and at the !trial recalled facts and
details with accuracy. He related specific details which
occurred before the accident such as going to the cleaners, arranging for the car, himself doing· part of the
driving, that he did not have a driver's license (Tr.
190-5), his friends and relatives at the hospital and
num·erous details as to the time and place and details of
his work (Tr. 180-223, 328-349). His only personal complaints after he got worse were nervousness, tiredness,
sleeplessness, etc. He remembered having a conversation
with Ben Duncan, the adjuster, August 14th (Tr. 340).
He remembered that day, the day he got out of the hospital very plainly because it was V-J Day (Tr. 183).
Remembered discussing settlement (Tr. 342). He read
and thought he understood the release (Tr. 343) and
voluntarily signed (Tr. 341, 343). Plaintiff said, "He
(Duncan) told me that he was going to fix the hospital
bills and get a release and he would give me $1,000 and
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so I was concerned about getting out of there and I didn't
care about nothing else.'' (Tr. 342). It was his understanding that he was being paid $1,000 plus medical and
hospital expenses (Tr. 348). He remembered cashing the
$1,000 draft without any trouble (Tr. 338) .
.As to September 5th, he knew he had the bill to pay
at the County Hospital when he went up to the bank
building that day (Tr. 337). He identified Duncan in the
courtroom as the man who took the release (Tr. 332).
Remembered signing the release ('Tr. 331). Said Duncan "wanted me to come back and do something to sign
a release * * * he mentioned release.'' Remembered getting his check and leaving (Tr. 334). Remembered that
the check was given to him for the County Hospital (Tr.
336), because the bill down there had not been paid. He
remembered endorsing the check (Tr. 337) and taking it
to the County Hospital (Tr. 338) .
.ARGUMENT
It seems apparent from plaintiff's own testimony
that he not only understood the na:ture and terms of the
settlement of .August 14th, but that his understanding of
the same was confirmed and interpreted by himself when
on September 5th, about {hree weeks later, he discovered
the County Hospital bill for $26.35 had been overlooked,
and went to the insurance office and requested Mr. Duncan to take care of that bill in accordance with their
agreement.
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Plaintiff's later cmnplaints of fatigue, sleeplessness,
forgetfulness, etc., the usual subjective symptoms in personal injury suits, did not n1ake him incompetent, much
less incompetent on AuguS't 14th or September 5, 1945,
when he had "no complaints." All who talked with him
August 14th, and the undisputed hospital records showed
that he was rational, conversed with people and understood them. The nurses were entirely disinterested witnesS'es. No one, not even :Mrs. Loy, a close friend of plaintiff, could admit of any irrationality on those dates the
releases were executed. None of plaintiff's other friends
and relatives, of which there were several who visited him
regularly at the hospital, were called by plaintiff to
testify. At the hospital on and prior to August 14th, and
for about three weeks between August 14th and September 5, 1945, plaintiff had plenty of opportunity to think
the matter over and seek advice or legal counsel.
However, he was planning to leave for Colorado the day
he left the hospital and was anxious to get his money. He
was feeling all right and had "no complaints." He knew
he was being paid $1000.00 general damages plus his hospital and medical expenS'e. He read and understood he
was signing a general release. He said he was concerned
about getting out of the hospital and ''didn't care about
nothing else.'' While later he may not have gotten along
as well as expected, it was not many months before he
was back to work, and at the time of the trial, he was
working full time in skilled industrial work from a high
scaffolding, a more responsible and remunerative job
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than his work repairing shoes before the accident oecurred.
August 14th and September 5, 1945, were the dates
on which the releases were ·executed, and if plaintiff was
mentally competent to sign a contract or release and
transact ordinary business on either one or both of those
dates, the settlement was conclusive so far as he was
concerned, and it became the duty of the trial court to
so direct the jury.
RATIFICATION BY RETAINING BENEFITS
Even if it should be assumed that plaintiff was incompetent to execute the releases of August 14th and
September 5th, 1945, upon regaining his competency,
(and he was admittedly competent when suit was commenced that Fall), it then became his duty to return the
benefits received in the settlement ( $1708.40) if he sought
to disavow or rescind the contract. By accepting and
retaining all of the benefits, he thereby again ratified and
confirmed the settlement.
AUTHORITIES AS TO RATIFICATION
In Coke v. Timby, 57 Utah 53, 192 Pac. 624, the action
was to set aside a release on the grounds of fraud. Plaintiff did not offer to return the consideration, $200.00,
prior to bringing suit, but did make a tender in open
court, which was refused by defendant. While the court
suggested that tender prior t~ bringing suit did not defeat
plaintiff's recovery, in that the $200.00 previously paid
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could be deducted from the verdict by the court without
prejudice to the defendant, however, that decision did
not pass upon the question involved in this case, nam,ely:
Whether, assuming plaintiff to be incompetent when he
signed the releases, it was his duty after admittedly regaining competency that Fall to either affirm or disaffirm the contract and offer to return the benefits received by him if he sought to rescind the releases.
In M,orris v. G.reat Northern Railway Co., (Minn.)
69 N. W. 628, the court held that failure to tender or return the consideration precluded plaintiff's right to
maintain a suit. The court said:
"Conceding plaintiff's mental incapacity on
that day, there is an insuperable obstacle to his
recovery in the fact that he has never rescinded
nor offered to rescind the settlement but still retains the consideration and has never offered to
return it.
"Upon recov·ering his usual mental condition,
it was his duty to elect promptly, that is, within
a reasonable time, whether he would affirm or
disaffirm and if he elected to do the latter, it was
his duty to restore or offer to restore what he
had received so as to place the parties in status
quo. He cannot affirm in part and reject in part.
He cannot escape the burdens of the contract and
retain its benefits. ''
In Gibson v. Western New Yor-k and P. R. Co., 30
Atl. 308, the court similarly held and said:
"It was his duty when he first learned of the
existence of the release to disavow it and at least
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before suit was brought, return or offer to return
the money received under it.
''Plaintiff cannot both affirm and disaffirm,
cannot affirm for what he got and disaffirm for
the difference between that and what he hoped to
get * * >ll'. His keeping the money * * * after restoration to mental health with undoubtedly
knowledge as to where the money came from and
why, is only consistent with an intent to affirm
the contract.''
See also Walker v. Harbison (Pa.), 128 Atl.
732; West v. Se.aboard Air Line R. Co., 151 N.C.
231, 65 S. E. 979; Mahr v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
170 Fed. 699; Roggenkamp, Exr'x v. Marks et al,
2 Auto Cases 974, (Ill.) 19 N. E. (2d) 828; Brown
v. Walker Lu.mber Co., 128 S. C. 161, 122 S. E. 670.
Retaining the benefits was not only ratification by
the plaintiff in the instant case, but it is not equit,able or
proper to permit plaintiff to retain all the benefits of
settlement, and at the same time gamble on a more favorable ·verdict, that is, he should not be permitted to eat his
cake and have it too.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit:
1.

Plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proof

that he was mentally incompetent to contract or sign the
releases either of August 14th or of September 5, 1945,
but the evidence is to the contrary that he was mentally
competent on those dates.
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2. That the plaintiff reaffirmed and ratified the
settlement of August 14th on September 5, 1945, by interpreting the contract of settlement in demanding payment of the County Hospital bill, thereby confirming his
understanding thereof.
3. That had the evidence been sufficient to prove
mental incompetency on August 14th and September 5th,
plaintiff again ratified and confirmed the settlement
when he regained competency shortly thereafter and retained all of the benefits of the setUement without tendering return of the same.
We respectfully submit that the judgment should be
reversed with directions that judgment be entered for
the defendant.
Respectfully submitted
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON,
E. F. BALDWIN, JR.
Attorneys for Defend(J!fl,.t and
.Appellant, Boyd Byron
Broadwate.r.
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